Alwaght- The several-decade dispute between the Turkish government and the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) in recent months has seen a contradictory shift: On the one hand, both sides showing pro-peace gestures and disarming the armed militias and on the other hand Turkey and its allies in Damascus amassing forces on the northern Syria borders and adopting a more aggressive discourse.
It seems that the peace process, which took a new breath with an order from PKK’s imprisoned leader Abdullah Ocalan for ceasefire and relative disarming in northern Iraq, is now running into a deadlock as a result of mutual political and security demands that act like a minefield to it. This dreadlock not only impacts the future of the Syrian and Turkish Kurds, but also endangers the already fragile peace in north eastern Syria. At the center of this storm stand the Kurdish-majority Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) who are on the one hand under the pressure of the March 10 agreement for integration into the Syrian army by the year’s end and on the other hand are being increasingly threatened by possible joint Turkish-Syrian military operation.
Stalemate in the negotiations: From peace symbolism to unrealizable conditions
The symbolic act by PKK forces in Iraq, burning weapons in response to Ocalan’s order, was quickly overshadowed by the group’s leadership presenting broader demands. They set the freedom of their leader who has been in the Turkish imprisonment since 1999 and the constitutional enshrinement of Kurdish rights in Turkey as the primary precondition for any meaningful progress in the peace process. The Turkish government, however, has rejected these terms and fundamentally holds a different view, denying that it overlooks Kurdish rights or that constitutional changes are necessary. Yet, the focal point of this stalemate lies not in the Qandil Mountains, but in northeastern Syria. Ankara insists on its demand for the complete disarmament of Syrian Kurds, whom it considers a branch of the PKK, including the People’s Protection Units (YPG) as the core of the SDF. This stance contrasts sharply with that of the Democratic Union Party (PYD), the leading party administering northeastern Syria, which explicitly denies any organizational ties to the PKK and, consequently, rejects disarming in response to Ocalan’s command.
Turkey explicitly views the SDF and their military wing, the People’s Protection Units (YPG), as an organizational extension of the PKK and considers their disarmament a prerequisite for any progress. In turn, ambiguity over whether Ocalan’s order even applies to Syrian Kurds, and, more critically, whether Syrian Kurdish leadership would obey such an order if it did, has further complicated the equation. The unequivocal stance of PYD leaders, rejecting disarmament, demonstrates that the distance between İmralı (the island where Ocalan is imprisoned) and Qamishli (as the seat of rule of the Syrian Kurds) is no less than it seems.
This dual stalemate, between Ankara and the PKK, and between Ankara and the SDF, has created a space where the language of diplomacy is gradually giving way to the language of military threat.
The clock ticking for confrontation
March 10, 2024 agreement between SDF commander Mazloum Abdi and Syrian interim President Ahmad al-Sharaa registered, who is better known for his nom de guerre Abu Mohammad al-Jolani, for integration of the Kurdish militias into the new Syrian army structure by the end of the current year has become a vital, while fragile, factor in this dynamic.
As the deadline nears, signs show that the sides of the deal are distancing from the spirit of the deal. Turkish officials have made it clear that they cannot accept appointment of YPG commanders as officers of the Syrian army and insist that SDF should join the army in separate units. This runs counter to the SDF demand for maintaining a degree of structural cohesion.
Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan has recently in a Doha meeting cast doubt on the integration plans running smoothly, adding: “YPG under the cover of fighting ISIS have spread in a vast area and now occupy land as well as the natural resources. Currently, one of the unsettled issues in this regard is whether they reach an agreement with the new [Syrian] government.” Pointing to March 10 agreement, Fidan said that so far no specific step has been taken by this group, blacklisted as a terrorist group by Ankara.
Simultaneously, field reports from northern Syria indicate the movement of large Turkish military convoys, comprising dozens of armored vehicles and hundreds of troops, into areas under its control in Afrin, Tal Abyad, and northern Aleppo. While these movements may currently have a demonstrative purpose, they undoubtedly send a warning message to the Kurds and their international backers. In recent days, Turkish pro-government media outlets, including the newspapers Türkiye and Sabah, have explicitly warned that if the March 10 agreement is not implemented, Damascus, with Ankara’s support, will launch a military operation.
Hilal Kaplan, a columnist for Sabah and a key pro-government figure, claimed on December 10 that developments along the Iraq-Syria corridor are exacerbating, rather than alleviating, Turkey’s security concerns. While Ankara cautiously continued the peace process, Kaplan asserted that the PKK and the SDF have taken no steps to ease tensions. He described internal actors within the Kurdish movement, from SDF units on the ground to the PKK leadership in Iraq’s Qandil Mountains, as signals undermining the prospect of a negotiated outcome. Kaplan argued that a decisive moment is approaching, where these actors will either align with Ocalan’s directives, or the process will unravel once again. He stated that the future of the peace process in Syria will be determined, and the question now is whether this line will be drawn peacefully or through violence.
Likewise, Hande Fırat, a journalist for Hürriyet, citing security sources, described time as running out and outlined Ankara’s firm demands as follows: the removal of PKK-linked command structures along the borders and the denial of any autonomous status for Syrian Kurds.
In the face of this surging threat, the SDF are pushing to strengthen their military and political position through an intriguing strategy: Mass recruitment of former Syrian army personnel.
According to a detailed report by Enab Baladi outlet, over 4,500 ex-army forces and loyalists to Bashar al-Assad, especially in strategic regions like Al-Omar and Koniko oilfields in Raqqa and Hasakah have joined the SDF. Prominent figures, including senior officers and generals like General Ali Khadhour ( Division 404) and General Shadi Dayoub (Presidential Guard) are among these those joking SDF ranks.
Here are the two motivations behind this recruitment:
Enhancing combat capability: The experience and expertise of these forces are being utilized to boost readiness against potential threats from Turkey and the Syrian government. Reports indicate that the number of SDF militia personnel now reaches approximately 100,000, providing them with significant operational capacity to confront threats from Turkish forces and new Syrian army
Strengthening the negotiating position: This move sends a political message to Damascus that the SDF can reorganize former power networks within its areas of control. These newly integrated forces act as a bargaining chip in negotiations concerning the future power structure in northeastern Syria. The goal is to pressure Damascus into accepting a formula that preserves a degree of administrative and security autonomy for the Kurds.
Still, this strategy does not go without tensions. Deep gap in pays (new officers paid up to $1,000 per month while older forces paid only around $150) had caused internal discontentment, even leading to defection of some older forces.
All these have one thing to say: Peace process is on a shaky foundation.
Role of foreign actors: Washington, Moscow, and Tel Aviv
The stance of key international actors is ambiguous but influential. On the one hand, Erdogan seems to be testing the tolerance of Trump. The Turkish officials claim that Washington understands the significance of working with Ankara for regional stability and at the end of the road will come to terms with dissolution of SDF as an independent structure. They even accuse Israel of encouraging the SDF to resist the Turkish push in a bid to disrupt the disarming process. Observations of such analysts suggest that SDF has been working for months to prepare defenses, including digging tunnels, demonstrating distrust in the talks and readiness for conflict.
Ankara’s decisions are not solely influenced by regional calculations. Turkey’s internal economic crisis, marked by soaring inflation and a plummeting lira, has exerted immense political pressure on Erdogan’s government. A recent poll by the pro-government GENAR institute reveals that over 65 percent of the public either “do not trust” or have “no trust at all” in the government’s economic management, with a majority expecting conditions to worsen.
In this climate, Erdogan, who has a history of leveraging national security and the Kurdish issue to mobilize his electoral base, may be tempted to pivot towards a hardline security discourse and limited military operations in Syria. This would divert public attention from economic difficulties. Such a move provides an additional political incentive to sideline a costly and arduous peace process in favor of flaunting of military power.
On the other hand, the role of Russia as a supporter of the previous Syrian government and an actor that held contact channels with the Kurds and also the Israeli regime that is striving for partition of Syria is unclear. Reports suggest indirect coordination of Moscow and Washington over recruitment of the former military forces of Syria to the SDF, something showing a push for securing the oilfields and management of gradual power transition.
Conclusion: Peace or war?
A complex of developments shows that Turkish-PKK peace is fragile and its fate is more than any other time tied to the northern Syria developments. Military preparation, stalemate in negotiations, recruitment of new forces, and Turkish home pressures all lead to a common result: If the current equation does not change, the next development will take place not on the negotiating table but the battleground.
