Alwaght- Amid rising tensions in the region that have unavoidably involved Iraq, inside the country the political and security situation is getting tense as the end of September ultimatum for the armed groups to disarm draws closer.
However, the issue of disarming the armed groups in Iraq should not be seen as a security decision or implementation of an article of the national constitution. If the government of Prime Minister Ali al-Zaydi truly starts the scheduled disarming plan, Iraq will jump in one of its most important periods of redefining political-security structure, a period about which the main question is not which group hands over arms, but how capable the government is to translate its political decision into a real authority on the ground.
In this regard, the US pressure will be a significant accelerant for disarmament, but it is no guarantee of success. Washington can supply Baghdad with financial, intelligence, and diplomatic tools, but the actual execution of this policy must ultimately rest with Iraqi institutions. That is the crucial distinction between external pressure for disarmament and genuine internal capacity to carry it out.
If the al-Zayidi government moves in this direction, it will likely first try to co-opt some armed groups by integrating them into formal state structures, rather than confronting them head-on. Politically, that approach makes sense because the government cannot take on every armed faction simultaneously. By converting some former fighters into security, administrative, or reserve personnel, it can pursue a monopoly on arms without immediately rupturing the political order.
The main issue is that the real trouble begins when certain groups reject the process. At that point, the government will face a binary choice: either dilute the monopoly principle by tolerating some armed forces outside its full control, or, for the first time in years, put its authority to a direct test against the armed groups.
In that scenario, we should not expect a sudden, all-out military crackdown. More likely, Baghdad will apply pressure in graduated steps, escalating methodically rather than all at once.
The first phase will be resorting to political and legal pressure. The government will try to put the opposed groups in a situation where continuing armed activities will mean violation of law and the formal government decision. In this phase, the talks to offer privileges for integration, ensuring political position, and offering an offramp from the militant structure will be significant.
The second phase will be financial pressure. If a group resists, the government can restrict its financial resources using financial, banking, and monitoring institutions. The aim is not necessarily to eliminate the group, but to hit its capability to maintain its independent military structure.
Phase three shifts to security and intelligence pressure. At this stage, the government would try to map out the command structures, weapons caches, communication networks, and human resources of armed groups. Intelligence cooperation with the US could become relevant here, but operations should be carried out by Iraqi forces whenever possible. Direct foreign boots on the ground risk transforming an armed standoff from a domestic dispute into a nationally charged cause célèbre.
The fourtg phase would involve targeted arrests of commanders and active members. If a group continues armed operations after political, financial, and intelligence measures have been exhausted, the government can reframe the case, from a political disagreement to a national security threat. At that point, operations would focus on specific individuals, field leader detentions, and securing sensitive facilities, rather than sweeping crackdowns on entire factions.
Phase five, the final stage, is limited military force. This becomes more likely only if an armed group openly attacks state forces, critical infrastructure, or economic assets. In that scenario, the government would probably keep operations contained, localized, and intelligence-driven, to avoid tipping into all-out civil war.
So if armed groups resist, the most probable government strategy is not a sudden, massive offensive, but a gradual erosion of their capacity: first negotiation, then legal and financial pressure, followed by intelligence and security sieges, and finally, calibrated military action.
This sequencing matters. The al-Zayidi government knows full well that a direct military confrontation with all groups at once could backfire spectacularly. Without political consensus behind it, a military operation could push rival factions to set aside their differences and rally against government. At that point, the problem would cease to be about disarming a few militias, and become a structural crisis in Iraq's political order itself.
So, the most important government tool will very likely be sowing division among integratable and unintegratable factions. The government will work to take in groups that are inclined to accept the legal framework and simultaneously politically isolate groups that insist on maintaining their independent military structure.
This strategy could become one of the government's greatest strengths. If all armed groups coalesce into a single unified front, the cost of confrontation for al-Zaydi would be prohibitive. But if some factions are absorbed into official structures while others remain isolated in the minority, the government can press forward with disarmament at a far lower price.
Meanwhile, the Sadrist movement, which is already on board with this policy, can play a pivotal role in legitimizing the policy domestically. Their sustained backing for a state monopoly on arms could allow al-Zayidi to reframe disarmament, not as a purely governmental project, but as a demand emanating from within Shiite political society itself. On the flip side, the State of Law coalition and forces aligned with Nouri al-Maliki will likely insist on preserving the legal, institutional framework of the Popular Mobilization Forces. So one of the fiercest battles ahead may not be over the principle of a "strong state" per se, but over the precise definition of where former armed groups fit within the official security architecture.
On the other hand, Sunni and Kurdish parties would not just sit this out as spectators. They will probably endorse the principle of a state weapons monopoly, but they will also demand that this policy not be wielded selectively against any single political current. In other words, to maintain their political support, Baghdad must demonstrate that disarmament is not about eliminating one faction, but part of a broader overhaul of Iraq's entire security structure.
Regionally, too, success could reshape Iraq's equations. Turkey would welcome any weakening of armed groups in the north, especially if it translates into tighter Baghdad control over border zones and energy infrastructure. Persian Gulf Arab states are likely to view disarmament as a sign of growing Iraqi stability; with reduced security risks, the runway for increased investment and deeper economic cooperation would grow considerably longer.
But there is an essential danger: If disarming goes without economic and political alternatives, it risks reproducing the same groups in a new frame.
If tens of thousands of armed personnel hand over arms but their employment, income resource, social position, and political future remain uncertain, somd of them can be recruited by underground networks, criminal groups, or smaller armed groups. So, economic integration is as important as security integration.
In this context, the cost the government bears for absorbing, retraining, and employing former fighters is really the price of long-term stability. If that bill goes unpaid, Baghdad might manage to collect weapons in the short run, but in the medium term, it will face a fresh wave of insecurity.
At the same time, weakening armed groups without simultaneously bolstering the army, police, counterterrorism forces, and intelligence apparatus could create a security vacuum. In places like Anbar, Salah al-Din, and the strategic corridors of northern and western Iraq, that void would offer fertile ground for terrorist networks and insurgent activity to regroup.
That is why this disarmament project must, in reality, be three projects rolled into one: disarmament, state-building, and security reconstruction.
If only the first piece is executed, the outcome could be instability. If all three move forward in tandem, Iraq could, for the first time in years, begin shifting toward a genuine concentration of security authority in official state institutions.
The most likely scenario, should armed groups resist, is neither a swift government victory nor a complete defeat. The likeliest outcome is a protracted, grinding process: a large portion of groups fold into the official structure, some fighters are absorbed into state or economic roles, and smaller, hardened remnants retreat underground.
In that scenario, sporadic attacks, American occupation bases, energy infrastructure, or government targets, could persist for a while. The government's response would gradually pivot from negotiation to intelligence operations, then to targeted arrests. If the attacks escalate, the government would probably move toward limited security operations against specific nodes, not a sweeping campaign against every former armed faction.
The single biggest mistake the government could make at this stage would be to turn disarmament into a war of political elimination. If opponents come to believe that the real goal is to purge them from the political system, their incentive to resist spikes. But if the government can draw a clear line between accepting the rule of law and being politically erased, the odds of success rise considerably.
Ultimately, Iraq's core question is not how many weapons will be collected. It is whether the state can forge a new consensus, about what power itself means in Iraq.
If the government can signal to armed groups that the end of their independent military structure does not necessarily mean the end of their political role, the disarmament path could become a managed transition of power. But if that message fails to land, the very same process could spiral into political fractures, protests, sporadic clashes, and the emergence of underground militant networks.
From this vantage point, a scenario of 70 percent disarmament by the end of 2027, with roughly 30 percent of decentralized networks remaining, is analytically plausible. But the government's true success will be measured not by the percentage of weapons collected, but by whether that remaining 30 percent gradually evolves from an armed threat into a manageable security problem.
It is also worth underscoring: Al-Zayidi's real test is not collecting guns, but it is building a state that can deliver security, jobs, justice, and political representation even after the guns are handed over. If these four elements are not developed in tandem, disarmament may simply change the form of resistance, not extinguish it. But if they are, Iraq could finally move beyond the era of multiple armed power centers and toward a concentration of state authority.
In such conditions, the 2026 and 2027 will not be the period of implementation of a merely security plan, but starting point for redefinition of the political-security compact, one in which involvement in political structure may continue but having an independent army and weapons outside the government structure will be unacceptable.
