Alwaght- As talks continue on the future of the Strait of Hormuz and the mediators are pushing to defuse tensions between the US and Iran, regional security equations enter a new stage. From Tehran's conditions to normalize the transit status in the Strait of Hormuz to the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait developments to the rise of new defense coalitions all bear witness to a transformation in the security balance post-war. In this regard, Alwaght has talked to Ahmad Zarean, an Iranian political analyst and chief of Tehran-based Andisheh Sazan-e-Nour Institute for Strategic Studies, asking him about the aspects of these developments and their impacts on the region.
Alwaght: While unofficial speculations and formal comments by the White House officials suggested that an agreement over the Strait of Hormuz is close to reach, Iran announced its six-point conditions for reopening the key waterway. Why do you think Tehran has made such conditions? Does Tehran see different prospects?
Zarean: Essentially, the reopening of this waterway is not on the agenda of the Islamic Republic of Iran, unless the Americans fulfill their obligations toward Iran. Traffic in the Strait of Hormuz will return to pre-war conditions only when the shadow of threats, assassination, and naval blockade is effectively lifted, and when Iran can achieve some of its other fundamental demands and interests, including receiving its blocked funds, the lifting of oil sanctions, and matters related to receiving compensation.
Naturally, as long as the Americans continue to use the language of threat to pressure Iran through naval blockades and other leverage tools, including economic sanctions, we, too, will use our leverage of controlling the Strait of Hormuz as a strategic advantage that can secure our interests in this confrontation, creating a balance with our American-Zionist enemy. Currently, the ongoing negotiations regarding the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz are merely our talks with the Omani side to specify the mechanism for traffic in the Strait and to determine a new legal regime for it. According to what the country's officials, including the foreign minister, have indicated, this agreement is in its final stages, but determining the shipping route is different from the issue of reopening.
Alwaght: Amid these Iranian conditions, Iran changed secretary of Supreme National Security Council. Is this related to the ongoing negotiations?
Zarean: No, it does not seem this post change is meaningfully related to the talks. However, picking the battle-tested General Mohsen Rezaei showed that from now on, foreign policy and defense and security policy of Tehran will grow more offensive, and it will pursue its national interests with even a stronger resolve.
Alwaght: Iran's New conditions were met by Washington’s negative response. Is now Trump in a position that finds it unavoidable to accept Iran's terms, lift the blockade, and end the war to facilitate reopening the Strait of Hormuz?
Zarean: Now the situation is very difficult for the Americans, because they have been unable to achieve their goals through either the tool of war or the tool of negotiation, and even negotiation under the shadow of war has not brought the US closer to its desired objective. Therefore, the most likely option for the US vis-à-vis Iran at this point is to build up economic pressure by tightening the naval blockade, hoping that through economic pressure, they can force Iran to unilaterally reopen the Strait of Hormuz without making any meaningful concessions.
In these circumstances, the decisive factor is the resilience of the two sides in this contest. In any case, the closure of the Strait of Hormuz will exacerbate the energy crisis and reduce the strategic reserves of countries around the world, especially in East Asia. On the other hand, the naval blockade also puts pressure on Iran's economy, so the decisive factor here is time, and if we can endure the economic conditions, the Americans will certainly be forced to grant the concessions we seek. Therefore, one of the Americans' leverage points for escalating pressure on us is that, alongside economic pressure, they can also agitate Iranian society and create grounds for internal instability, and we must remain vigilant in this regard.
Alwaght: Along with Hormuz crisis, Bab-el-Mandeb closure is causing some developments, including trilateral Mecca agreement. How do you see this defense pact and its function?
Zarean: First, we should note that the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait has been closed to Saudi ships because Saudi Arabia has imposed a cruel blockade on Yemen for the past 10 years across maritime, aerial, and land domains. In response to this action, the Yemenis have decided at this juncture to prevent ships from transiting the Bab el-Mandeb Strait in order to force the Saudis to reconsider their blockade of Yemen. Additionally, by striking blows against Saudi-allied militias in Yemen, they have effectively foiled Saudi Arabia's plan to undermine the sovereignty of the Sanaa government.
Regarding the trilateral agreement between Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan, the Saudis have come to realize that the United States is unable to provide for their security, and that the presence of Americans and their bases in the region has not only failed to bring them security but has actually caused insecurity at the regional level. Therefore, the Saudis have moved toward new security arrangements and are trying to maintain their security through new defense agreements. However, based on what we have observed from this agreement, for now it has mostly been symbolic, propagandistic, and diplomatic in nature, and it is far from the operational stage, because the details of how the members of this agreement would participate in each other's defense have not yet been specified, and no joint defense force has been formed.
Moreover, there are other serious obstacles, including the fact that Pakistan and Turkey have considerations regarding regional cases, and Ankara also has disagreements with Riyadh on some regional matters.
Therefore, it appears that these countries will act cautiously in supporting one another and will also take into account the requirements and constraints of other actors, especially given that Turkish officials have stated that this agreement is not directed against regional countries. Of course, we should also note that a general concern has emerged among regional countries regarding the expansionism of the Zionist regime, and the 'Mecca Agreement' is a collective measure to counter that regime's expansionist plans. This is particularly significant after Netanyahu announced the formation of a 'hexagonal alliance' centered on the Zionist regime, involving India, Cyprus, and some Arab and African countries, against the Axis of Resistance and the Sunni axis. Naturally, the Sunni axis includes Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Pakistan, and some other regional countries. Therefore, there is currently a shared concern among regional countries about the policies of the Zionist regime, and this agreement can be seen as a step toward preserving the security of these countries against that regime.
Alwaght: Some argue that Saudi Arabia forged this alliance out of concern for expansion of conflict and of support of other members of the Axis of Resistance, especially Iraq and even Iran, to Yemen's Ansarullah in the capital Sana'a. How valid is this argument?
Zarean: At present, we cannot say with certainty that this agreement is aimed against Iran, or Axis of Resistance members in Iraq and Yemen. But yes, it is driven by, primarily, Saudi Arabia and then Pakistan and Turkey’s concerns. Pakistan is under threat from India, which is an Israeli ally. Also, Netanyahu threatened Turkey and in diplomatic, discursive, and media terms, they have gone tougher against each other in recent days. We can also see Israeli backing to separatist movements, which is detrimental and costly to Ankera.
On the other hand, the Israeli regime's actions in the region are, in many cases, particularly when it comes to balance of power, harmful to Saudi Arabia. Therefore, it appears that this alliance is mainly directed against the Zionist regime, and it also serves as a form of reassurance to Saudi Arabia, which has grown disillusioned with the US role in providing for its regional security.
