Alwaght- After a breathtaking week in Iraq amid concerns about the unpredictable outcome of the government's pressure on Kataib Hezbollah resistance group to evacuate Jurf Al-Sakhr and trade of threats, the standoff finally ended without any tension and in full peace. The two agreed to hand over control of the base to the government forces on Thursday.
But the Jurf Al-Sakhr base case in Iraq's Babil province cannot be written off as a mere bureaucratic or security dispute over a military position. It must be viewed through a far broader lens; one that takes in the future of resistance groups in Iraq, the political pressure to reconfigure the country's security equation, and efforts to drag Iraqi parties into an internal confrontation, all at a moment when the region is gripped by mounting sensitivities and the prospect of an escalating US–Iran confrontation.
Seen in this light, the Jurf Al-Sakhr crisis is a test of the Iraqi government's capacity to manage security and economic cases on the one hand, and of the resistance groups' ability to contain internal disagreements and put national interests ahead of organizational reservations on the other.
Strategic location of Jurf Al-Sakhr and record of resistance groups' presence in the area
Jarf Al-Sakhr, also known as Jurf Al-Sakhr, occupies a geography of outsized strategic value. The base sits in northern Babil province, roughly 50 to 60 kilometers southwest of Baghdad, placing it at the geographic junction of Babil, Anbar, and the southern reaches of the Baghdad belt. A web of ground routes links it to key areas such as Latifiya, Iskandariya, Yusufiya, and Mahmoudiya.
That position has made this region a linchpin in securing southern Baghdad and blocking armed groups' infiltration from western Iraq toward the center and south of the country. Its proximity to the roads connecting Baghdad with the holy cities of Karbala and Najaf only adds to its security and geographic weight, cementing its status as one of the central belt's key nodes.
But the area's present-day significance cannot be understood without returning to the events of 2014. At that juncture, ISIS seized Jarf al-Sakhr and used the area as one of its staging and operational hubs in northern Babil. The geography allowed the terrorists to threaten Baghdad's security on one flank and the routes to Karbala and Najaf on the other.
During the October 2014 operation to liberate Jarf al-Sakhr, Iraqi army and security forces fought alongside various resistance groups, including Kataib Hezbollah and the Badr Organization. The operation broke ISIS in the area and led to its renaming as Jarf Al-Sakhr, a change that came to symbolize the Iraqi forces' victory over takfiri terrorism. The resistance forces' presence on this terrain, then, is rooted in the conditions of war and the mission to counter the ISIS threat, contrary to the image of an arbitrary deployment that may be presented.
Indeed, Kataib Hezbollah and other resistance forces established themselves in the area at a time when ISIS was seen not merely as a local security threat but as a grave danger to Iraq's political and security existence. From this vantage point, the history of these forces' presence cannot be separated from their role in liberating the area and preventing the return of terrorism.
The push to change Iraq's security equation
The significance of Jurf Al-Sakhr crisis is not limited to the government's decision to hold the region, but to the timing and way of the implementation of the plan.
The starting point of the crisis was November 11, when the government of Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi formed a committee to probe suspected oil smuggling in the region. After that, the government's spokesman said that the inspectors in their investigation discovered evidence of manipulation of oil pipelines and also found two refining units and fuel storages.
The government followed up by announcing the dismissal of nine security and administrative officials, among them Babil's police chief and the commander of the Popular Mobilization Forces (Hashd al-Shaabi) in the province, and demanded that Kataib Hezbollah withdraw from the area, setting a deadline for the move.
The resistance movement rejected the oil-smuggling allegations, arguing the equipment and storage tanks discovered were used to fuel military vehicles. The government's claims and Kataib's response should therefore be read as two conflicting positions in a case that still demands an independent judicial review.
On November 16, however, the Iraqi government announced that the PM had ordered armed forces into the area and given Kataib Hezbollah a deadline to evacuate it.
That ultimatum has refocused attention on al-Zaidi's earlier deadlines for disarming groups tied to the PMF; deadlines that have more to do with the weighty question of restructuring Iraq's security architecture than with fighting corruption. The suspicion took shape from the outset: was Jurf Al-Sakhr really about addressing oil violations, or had the oil file been turned into a lever for reopening the debate over the military presence of resistance groups in Iraq?
It is noteworthy that al-Zaidi returned from a trip to Washington and a meeting with Donald Trump facing American pressure to disarm the resistance groups, and he has since floated deadlines to make that happen.
Chaos scenario: Behind the scenes game of Washington and Tel Aviv
To grasp the significance of the Jurf Al-Sakhr developments, one must also weigh Iraq's regional circumstances at the moment this crisis took shape. In the equations of the US–Iran and US–Israeli confrontation, Iraq's place runs deeper than that of a mere neighboring state. Iraq's resistance forces, especially since the recent war, have become a key component of deterrence against Washington's and Tel Aviv's military designs.
Within that framework, weakening these forces and constraining their operational capacity is among the objectives pursued in US policy toward Iraq. Washington's open pressure on the al-Zaidi government to disarm the resistance groups is a clear signal of that orientation.
Against this backdrop, Jurf Al-Sakhr could serve as a fitting launch point for a costly scenario, one that pits the resistance against the government on one side and threatens Iraq's overall stability on the other. It is a scenario in which the dispute between the government and Kataib Hezbollah escalates into armed confrontation, draws other resistance groups into the crisis, and ultimately opens a deep fissure in Iraq's political and security architecture.
For Washington, such a situation carried several potential dividends. First, setting the resistance forces against the central government and eroding their political and social legitimacy; second, laying the groundwork to expand security operations against other resistance groups under the banner of restoring the state's monopoly on arms; and third, tying up these forces' political and military capacities in internal disputes rather than letting them influence regional equations.
Resistance show of patience
In revisiting the aspects and outcomes of this security case, the most important issue is the way the resistance groups are dealing with the Jurf Al-Sakhr standoff. This affair offers an opportunity to examine, once again, the resistance's familiar pattern of political and security behavior from a vantage point beyond the dispute over a single military base.
The Friday developments showed that Iraqi forces entered the disputed region according to security agreements and there were pre-agreeed arrangements for reposition of Kataib Hezbollah in other regions and entrusting security responsibility of Jurf Al-Sakhr to the units of army, federal police, and the PMF.
According to Shafaqna, one of the main proposals was to transfer part of Kataib's forces to the Iraq–Syria border areas and replace them at Jurf Al-Sakhr with two brigades of the PMF forces.
In this light, acceptance of the force-restructuring arrangements can be read as the resistance's restraint and sacrifice to preserve Iraq's security and stability and avert internal tension, a case of national considerations outranking organizational interests and factional calculations. That is not to say the move amounts to accepting all the allegations leveled or to waiving the resistance groups' political and security demands.
Another point that drew extensive coverage in the Iraqi press was the diplomatic deftness of General Esmail Qaani, commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps' Quds Force, in managing this sensitive file.
According to reports published in Iraqi and regional media, Qaani held meetings with Iraq's prime minister, leaders of the Shiite Coordination Framework, and commanders of the resistance groups, and in those consultations floated proposals to restructure Kataib Hezbollah's forces and bring in other PMF units and security forces as replacements.
Reports also surfaced of a three-member committee, comprising Hadi al-Amiri, Falih al-Fayyadh, and Abdulaziz al-Mohammadawi formed to carry proposals for resolving the crisis to Kataib Hezbollah.
The significance of this mediating role should not be reduced to an effort to broker agreement between the two sides. The core issue was preventing Iraq's internal disputes from becoming a crisis that outside parties could exploit to advance their own agendas.
